Hussein Fayyad’s Reappearance Highlights Israeli Intelligence Failures in Gaza
Military expert Elias Hanna dissects Israel's missteps during the war in Gaza, revealing gaps in intelligence and the resilience of Palestinian resistance forces.
Watan-The appearance of Hussein Fayyad, commander of the Beit Hanoun Battalion in Al-Qassam Brigades, reveals the extent of the intelligence failure suffered by Israel during its war on the Gaza Strip, according to military expert Elias Hanna.
On Wednesday, Palestinian platforms released a video allegedly showing Fayyad (Abu Hamza) alive, eight months after the Israeli army announced his assassination in the northern part of the Strip.
According to Israeli army radio, the army issued a statement acknowledging that its earlier announcement of Fayyad’s death was incorrect.
Not the First Time
This is not the first time Israel has claimed to have killed a resistance leader during the war, Hanna noted, referencing Mahmoud Hamdan, the commander of the Tel Al-Sultan Battalion. Israel had previously announced Hamdan’s killing along with Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, only for that information to later be proven inaccurate.
When Israeli forces entered Al-Shifa Hospital, they released a list of Hamas leaders, some of whom were already dead or outside the Strip, claiming they had been captured during the operation. At the time, Israeli army spokesperson Daniel Hagari later admitted the statement was inaccurate, describing the issue as a “technical error.”
When you declare the death of a specific leader, you must have precise information about their life, movements, and other critical details, such as DNA analysis, Hanna said. This incident highlights Israel’s lack of sufficient intelligence, in his view.
Hanna explained that the Israeli announcement of Fayyad’s death was based on his confirmed presence at the targeted location but lacked conclusive evidence of his death.
Resistance’s Strategy
The resistance forces have refrained from confirming the deaths of many leaders whom Israel claimed to have assassinated during the war, aiming to deny the Israeli army a clearer picture and accurate intelligence, Hanna explained.
These errors reflect a lack of daily tactical intelligence on the part of the Israeli army, Hanna said. He cited earlier statements about the presence of 250 kilometers of tunnels in Gaza, later contradicted by investigations estimating the tunnels’ length at 750 kilometers.
He added that the ability of resistance forces to move between the north and south of Gaza, despite the scale of destruction and bombardment, underscores the existence of many operational tunnels.
The key takeaway from these mistakes, according to Hanna, is that Israel lacks effective on-the-ground agents capable of providing accurate information.
Israel relies on artificial intelligence programs, such as Lavender and Hasura, to target leaders based on pre-fed data. However, Hanna noted that much of this information has proven to be inaccurate.
Even the assassination of Sinwar, which occurred by coincidence, highlighted the weakness of Israeli intelligence. The Israeli army attempted to target him inside tunnels while he was actually moving above ground and actively participating in battles, reflecting his boldness and strategic planning capabilities, Hanna said.
Hanna concluded that the unfolding events are the fallout from the dust of battle settling, which will reveal many factors likely linked to the wave of resignations initiated by Israeli military leaders following the ceasefire.