Watan-For Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the Gaza war has created a dilemma,” Bernard Haykel, a professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University in the United States, began his analysis published by the American magazine “Foreign Affairs.”
Haykel said, “Hamas controls Gaza, an Islamic movement aligned and closely coordinated with Iran and its proxies, who seek to see the destruction of the Saudi ruling family. But considering the popularity of the Palestinian cause among Saudi citizens, Mohammed bin Salman must stand alongside the Palestinians, who are viewed throughout the Arab and Islamic worlds as victims of Israeli aggression and occupation.”
The Saudi government aims to bolster its security and hopes that through normalizing relations with Israel, it can establish a security alliance with the United States and Washington’s regional allies.
However, Riyadh will not establish such relations when Israel bombs civilians in Gaza and refuses to acknowledge the Palestinians’ right to establish their state.
Nevertheless, normalization was not the only way for the Al Saud family to strengthen its grip. The regime can also protect itself and its interests by building a stronger economy and changing the country’s internal ideology.
To achieve this goal, Saudi Arabia is actively developing new sectors unrelated to oil, such as tourism, mining, logistics services, manufacturing, technology, finance, and transportation.
Increasingly, the royal regime seeks to legitimize its rule by presenting itself as the protector of the Saudi people and promoting a strong nationalistic sentiment that prioritizes Saudi interests.
The resulting changes encompass almost every aspect of the country’s society, from legal and educational systems to the roles of religious authorities and women. Instead of obligating itself to spread “true Islam,” the legitimacy of the royal regime relies on its ability to achieve unity, peace, and prosperity in its region.
A Major Transformation in Saudi Arabia
A significant shift is happening in Saudi Arabia, and the war on Gaza has complicated this transformation. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia still aims to normalize relations with Israel, but it demands a much higher price for diplomatic ties.
Now Saudis insist that Israelis make tangible concessions that would lead to the establishment of a viable Palestinian state. They also seek to convince Washington to officially recognize the still intangible state of Palestine, while calling on the United Nations Security Council to do the same.
Riyadh believes that resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict fairly will weaken Tehran and stabilize the Middle East, allowing the Kingdom to accomplish its national transformation and vision of creating an interconnected and prosperous region, with itself at the center.
Mohammed bin Salman’s goal is to make Saudi Arabia, in his words, “normal.” By this, he means a socially open and economically dynamic society, albeit one still under authoritarian control. People would be free to some extent but unable to impose their beliefs on others.
Palestine is not an Islamic issue for Saudi Arabia
The kingdom places great importance on its sovereignty and the sovereignty of other nations, so it does not condemn the plight of the Uighurs (a predominantly Muslim minority) under the Chinese Communist Party or the plight of Indian Muslims under India’s ruling Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party. When Riyadh invokes the Palestinian issue, it’s a national matter, not an Islamic one.
Saudi Arabia sees ideologies and movements that advocate transnational intervention as dangerous. Consequently, it has banned many of them, including the Muslim Brotherhood.
Instead, Riyadh’s vision of the global system is technological and neoliberal, even if the government deploys state capitalism to develop new economic sectors and reshape existing ones.
It is possible that Mohammed bin Salman’s initiatives could help boost the prosperity of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and thereby the popularity of his regime. However, for them to succeed, peace must prevail. Mohammed bin Salman came to this realization after several years of pursuing aggressive foreign policies, such as his involvement in the war in Yemen, the blockade of Qatar, and the hostile stance towards Iran – including likening Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to Hitler.
These actions led to instability in the Kingdom and exposed Mohammed bin Salman’s objectives to risk.
At the same time, Islamist leaders across the Islamic world tarnished Riyadh’s reputation as being subservient to the United States and a renegade regime.
As a result, the Kingdom adjusted its stance. Now, the Saudi official response to these taunts has become muted, and its policy towards its rivals has become conciliatory.
The decisions helped push Mohammed bin Salman towards adopting his new approach in the region, as well as building stronger relations with China, India, and Russia. These collectively shape Saudi policy first, as Mohammed bin Salman considers all kinds of options to secure his dynasty’s rule.
This caution helps explain why Saudi Arabia refused to join the U.S.-led maritime alliance to halt Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea.
Over time, Saudis expect their economic interests to outweigh the more hardline ideological commitments. Hence, Riyadh is keen on building financial and investment relations with Iran and the Houthis, hoping these private interests will ultimately protect the Kingdom from their aggressive actions.
But Mohammed bin Salman is not naive about his adversaries’ desire to harm his country, nor is he naive about their capabilities. Iran and its allies will never become friends of Saudi Arabia, just as Israel and the United States are militarily stronger than to be entirely defeated.
Saudi Arabia has witnessed, after all, the grandiose and fantastical Axis of Resistance movie before. Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt attempted to spread revolutionary Arab nationalism, as did Saddam Hussein in Iraq through his Ba’athist political movement and military aggression. The results were disastrous. There is no military solution capable of establishing a Palestinian state, nor is there a way to force the United States out of the Middle East.
In fact, Saudis hope for increased U.S. engagement in the region. Crown Prince’s pursuit of normalizing relations with Israel, in part, was a means to secure a broader security agreement with the United States.
In exchange for a Saudi embassy in Israel, the Kingdom sought to conclude a mutual defense treaty with Washington that would protect Saudi Arabia from any external attack and provide it with a U.S.-managed nuclear program.
Saudi Arabia would then become a strategic ally of the United States, with a status similar to that of Japan or South Korea. This would be a significant achievement for Riyadh and a feather in Mohammed bin Salman’s cap. It would be a greater achievement than the establishment of relations between the founder of the Kingdom, Ibn Saud, and U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt in 1945 – which heralded decades of cooperation between the two countries and remarkable economic progress.
However, at present, any prospect of normalization with Israel remains suspended in the long term, given the destruction in Gaza. The Palestinian issue, sidelined after the Arab Spring revolutions in 2011, has once again become central in Middle Eastern politics, thanks to Hamas attacks on October 7th.
The Saudis do not hold a great deal of respect for the Palestinian leadership, but they feel compelled to align with the rest of the world. The Arab world condemns Israel. The Saudi Foreign Minister and other princes issued statements condemning Israel’s actions as war crimes and called for an immediate ceasefire.
In late January, the Saudi government supported South Africa’s accusation against Israel before the International Court of Justice for committing genocide in Gaza.
However, these statements were milder compared to criticisms from other regional countries, and Saudis hope to resume the normalization campaign soon. But they now expect serious concessions from the Israelis, concessions that would lead to the establishment of a viable Palestinian state.
Anything less would accuse Mohammed bin Salman of betrayal, especially given his status as a prominent Arab leader and guardian of the holiest Islamic sites.
This means that the deal reported by The Huffington Post, offered by Israelis with payment and mediation from the United States, would not suffice. While this deal might involve normalization in exchange for certain guarantees for the Palestinians, it does not seem to create tangible steps towards statehood. In the absence of such a path, Saudis won’t sign onto it. They’ve made it clear they won’t clean up the mess the day after the war ends.
No one can guess whether meaningful steps are possible in light of Israel’s hardline policies and the political ambitions of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
But Hamas’s attack has made the Palestinian issue an important element in how Riyadh now considers its national interest. Therefore, it has pushed Saudi Arabia to re-engage as a strong supporter of the Palestinian state’s establishment. In this regard, Hamas secured a victory for the Palestinians, but perhaps not for itself.